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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE—JURISDICTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON FEDERAL
JUDGES’ ABILITY TO AUTHORIZE ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE: A CRY FOR
CONGRESSIONAL GUIDANCE
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine a drug distribution operation so vast that it takes more than
forty people to run it.1 This kind of operation is the type Los Dahda (“Mr.
Dahda”) found himself joining as an importer and a dealer.2 Mr. Dahda had
several roles in which he helped facilitate the transactions, including “driving money from Kansas to California for someone in the group to buy the
marijuana, assisting with the purchase and packaging of marijuana in California, loading marijuana into crates for shipment to Kansas, and selling the
marijuana in Kansas to individuals who redistributed the marijuana to others.”3 The network operated for nearly seven years and brought approximately $17 million worth of drugs to Kansas.4 The government began investigating the drug network in 2011 and obtained wiretap authorization orders
covering telephones used by the suspected members of the network.5
After years of surveillance, prosecutors indicted forty-three people, including Mr. Dahda, for trafficking in marijuana, cocaine, and methamphetamine.6 Prosecutors obtained the majority of the evidence against Mr. Dahda
through nine wiretap orders issued by the United States District Court for
the District of Kansas.7 Prior to trial, Mr. Dahda moved to suppress the intercepted communications, arguing that the wiretap orders exceeded the
district court’s territorial jurisdiction and thus, were facially insufficient.8
The question presented in Dahda v. United States is whether Title III of
the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§
2510–2520 (“Title III”), requires suppression of evidence obtained pursuant
to a wiretap order that is facially insufficient because the order exceeds the
1. United States v. Dahda, 853 F.3d 1101, 1106 (10th Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 138 S.
Ct. 356, 356 (U.S. Oct. 16, 2017) (No. 17-43).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 1105–06.
4. Id.; Lawrence Twins convicted in $17 million drug conspiracy that ran through
barbecue
joint,
THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
(July 24, 2014, 3:54 PM),
http://www.kansascity.com/news/local/crime/article796203.html.
5. Dahda, 853 F.3d at 1106.
6. Ian Cummings & Shaun Hittle, Day 1: From the Emerald Triangle to the Sunflower
State, LAWRENCE JOURNAL WORLD (May 26, 2013, 4:13 PM), http://www2.ljworld.com/
news/2013/may/26/day-1-emerald-triangle-sunflower-state-inside-stor/.
7. Dahda, 853 F.3d at 1111.
8. Id.
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judge’s territorial jurisdiction.9 This question has divided the circuit courts
that have answered it.10 In April 2017, Mr. Dahda and his brother, Roosevelt
Rico Dahda, filed for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.11 The Supreme Court of the
United States granted the petition on October 16, 2017.12
This note argues five points: (1) a cell phone is not a “mobile interception device” that falls within the court’s ability to issue a wiretap order because “mobile interception device” means a mobile device used to intercept
a telephone call—a cell phone is the thing being intercepted, not the thing
used to do the intercepting13; (2) courts should not apply the “core concerns”
reasoning because doing so renders provisions of Title III meaningless14; (3)
Title III requires suppression of evidence obtained pursuant to a wiretap
order that is facially insufficient because the order exceeds the judge’s territorial jurisdiction15; (4) if the “core concerns” test is applied, courts should
conclude that territorial jurisdiction limitations implicate a core concern of
Title III16; and (5) congressional interpretation of Title III’s ambiguous pro-

9. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Dahda v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 356, 356
(2017) (No. 17–43) (In the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, the Dahda
Court had multiple questions before it. One of these questions involved the interpretation of
the phrase “mobile interception device” as it is used in Title III. Although that particular
question was not before the Supreme Court of the United States, it is still an important one on
which the United States circuit courts are split. Further, whether a “mobile interception device” is used has a direct effect on whether a wiretap order is facially insufficient. Therefore,
the interpretation of the phrase “mobile interception device” will be discussed in detail
throughout this note).
10. Compare Dahda, 853 F.3d at 1113–14 (holding that the territorial jurisdiction limitation does not implicate a core concern of Title III and, thus, evidence obtained as a result of
a facially insufficient wiretap order need not be suppressed), with United States v. Glover,
736 F.3d 509, 514–16 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (holding that the “core concerns” reasoning should
not be applied to motions to suppress facially insufficient wiretap orders and even if it is
applied, the territorial jurisdiction limitation implicates a core concern of Title III, and therefore, evidence obtained as a result of a facially insufficient wiretap order must be suppressed).
11. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 8, at 2.
12. Dahda v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 356, 356 (U.S. Oct. 16, 2017) (No. 17-43). On
May 14, 2018, the Supreme Court, held (1) Title III’s provision requiring suppression if a
wiretap order is “insufficient on its face” does not contain a “core concerns” requirement, and
(2) wiretap orders authorizing interception of communications outside the district court’s
territorial jurisdiction were not “insufficient on their face” within the meaning of the wiretap
statute’s suppression provision, abrogating Glover, 736 F.3d at 513. Dahda v. United States
138 S. Ct. 1491, 1492 (2018).
13. See infra Part III.A.
14. See infra Part III.B.
15. See infra Part III.C.
16. See infra Part III.C.
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visions is long overdue, especially considering technological advances that
have taken place since its enactment.17
Part II of this note discusses the purposes of Title III, as well as Congress’s motives in enacting the statute, the “territorial jurisdiction” limitation, Title III’s suppression remedy, the current circuit split on the interpretation of the phrase “mobile interception device,” and the current circuit
split on the application of Title III’s suppression remedy when a wiretap
authorization order is insufficient on its face.18 Part III argues congressional
action is long overdue to interpret Title III and settle the issues dividing the
United States circuit courts.19 Part IV concludes this note.20
II. BACKGROUND
A.

The Purpose of Title III is to Regulate Electronic Eavesdropping by
Government Officials, as Well as Private Actors.

In 1968, Congress enacted Title III to regulate electronic eavesdropping by government officials, as well as private actors.21 Title III covers the
intentional interception by any means of wire, oral, and electronic communications.22 The statute codified Berger v. New York23 and Katz v. United
States.24 In particular, Title III addresses the procedural requirements that
the Supreme Court articulated in Berger.25
The law at issue in Berger authorized electronic eavesdropping without
procedural safeguards.26 The Court laid out the following procedural requirements that the New York statute failed to meet:
(1) Particularity in describing the place to be searched and the person or
thing to be seized; (2) Particularity in describing the crime that has been,
is being, or is about to be committed; (3) Particularity in describing the
type of conversation sought; (4) Limitations on the officer executing the
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

See infra Part III.D.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 66 (1968), as reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2153–

54.
22. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2518 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-231).
23. S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 2194 (citing Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967), in
which the Supreme Court invalidated a New York law which authorized electronic eavesdropping without required procedural safeguards, holding that the “basic purpose of the
Fourth Amendment is to safeguard privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by government officials”).
24. Id. at 2185 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)).
25. Berger, 388 U.S. at 58–59.
26. Id. at 43.
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eavesdrop that would (a) prevent his searching unauthorized areas, and
(b) prevent further searching once the property sought is found; (5)
Probable cause in seeking to renew the eavesdrop order; (6) Dispatch in
executing the eavesdrop order; (7) Requiring the executing officer to
make a return on the eavesdrop order showing what was seized; and (8)
A showing of exigent circumstances in order to overcome the defect of
not giving prior notice.27

In Katz, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the standards set out in Berger.28
Congress used the Court’s decisions in these two cases as a guide when
drafting Title III.29
Legislative history indicates that Congress was concerned with “the
tremendous scientific and technological developments that have taken place
in the last century [that] have made possible today the widespread use and
abuse of electronic surveillance techniques.”30 The Senate expressed fear
that individual privacy was in jeopardy as a result of new and improved surveillance techniques.31 It called for comprehensive, fair, and effective reform, emphasizing the need for uniform standards.32
Congress articulated two main concerns that animate Title III: “(1) protecting the privacy of wire and oral communications; and (2) delineating on
a uniform basis the circumstances and conditions under which the interception of wire and oral communications may be authorized.”33 Title III protects
privacy by limiting who is authorized to conduct wiretaps34 and creating an
evidentiary burden.35
B.

Obtaining a Wiretap Authorization Order

To obtain a wiretap authorization order, a law enforcement officer must
file an application with a judge of competent jurisdiction.36 Section 2518(3)
27. S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 2161–62 (citing Berger, 388 U.S. at 74).
28. Id. at 2162.
29. Id. at 2163.
30. Id. at 2154.
31. Id. (“No longer is it possible, in short, for each man to retreat into his home and be
left alone. Every spoken word relating to each man’s personal, marital, religious, political, or
commercial concerns can be intercepted by an unseen auditor and turned against the speaker .
. . .”).
32. Id. at 2156.
33. S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 2153.
34. United States v. Dahda, 853 F.3d 1101, 1115 (10th Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 138 S.
Ct. 356, 356 (U.S. Oct. 16, 2017) (No. 17-43) (citing S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 66) (“only duly
authorized law enforcement officers engaged in the investigation or prevention of specified
types of serious crimes”).
35. Id. (explaining the evidentiary burden for obtaining a wiretap is probable cause).
36. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2510(9)(a) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-231) (“‘judge of competent jurisdiction’ means (a) a judge of a United States district court or a United States court

2019]

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

441

authorizes a judge to approve a wiretap within the territorial jurisdiction of
the court in which the judge sits.37 Title III permits courts to authorize law
enforcement’s interception of telephone communications.38 The term “intercept”39 is broadly defined in Title III and includes the use of a “device”40 to
acquire the “contents”41 of any telephone call.42 Moreover, interception occurs both where the tapped telephone is located and where law enforcement
officers put their listening post.43
Title III comes with limits, however, one of which is the territorial jurisdiction limitation.44 Generally, a judge’s authority to authorize law enforcement’s interception of telephone communications is limited to his or
her territorial jurisdiction.45 An exception exists, however, that allows interception outside the judge’s territorial jurisdiction when a “mobile interception device” is used.46 This phrase has been interpreted differently among
federal courts.47
C.

Title III’s Suppression Remedy

Under Title III, a suppression remedy exists for communications that
were intercepted (i) unlawfully; (ii) based on a facially insufficient wiretap
of appeals; and (b) a judge of any court of general criminal jurisdiction of a State who is
authorized by a statute of that State to enter orders authorizing interceptions of wire, oral, or
electronic communications”).
37. § 2518(3).
38. §§ 2510–2520.
39. § 2510(4) (“‘intercept’ means the aural or other acquisition of the contents of any
wire, electronic, or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or
other device”).
40. § 2510(5) (“‘electronic, mechanical, or other device’ means any device or apparatus
which can be used to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication . . . .”).
41. § 2510(8) (“‘contents’ when used with respect to any wire, oral, or electronic communication, includes any information concerning the substance, purport, or meaning of that
communication”).
42. § 2510(4).
43. See, e.g., United States v. Dahda, 853 F.3d 1101, 1111–12 (10th Cir. 2017), cert.
granted, 138 S. Ct. 356, 356 (U.S. Oct. 16, 2017) (No. 17-43); United States v. Jackson, 849
F.3d 540, 551 (3d Cir. 2017); United States v. Luong, 471 F.3d 1107, 1109 (9th Cir. 2006);
United States v. Ramirez, 112 F.3d 849, 852 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v. Denman, 100
F.3d 399, 403 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Tamarez, 40 F.3d 1136, 1138 (10th Cir.
1994); United States v. Rodriguez, 968 F.2d 130, 136 (2d Cir. 1992).
44. § 2518(3).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Compare Dahda, 853 F.3d at 1113 (holding that the phrase “mobile interception
device” can only mean a listening device that is mobile, and thus, a stationary listening device does not qualify as a mobile interception device for purposes of the statute), with
Ramirez, 112 F.3d at 853 (holding that a mobile interception device does include a stationary
listening post used to intercept mobile communications).
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authorization order; or (iii) not in conformity with the wiretap authorization
order.48 Section 2515 provides that evidence obtained as a result of a violation of Title III must be suppressed.49
It is essential to determine the validity of a wiretap order in order to assess whether evidence obtained as a result of a wiretap order should be suppressed.50 Further complicating the matter, the fact that a wiretap order is
facially insufficient does not mean suppression is required.51 Instead, suppression is required only if a court determines that the jurisdiction requirement is one of “those statutory requirements that directly and substantially
implement[s] the congressional intention to limit the use of intercept[ion]
procedures to those situations clearly calling for the employment of this
extraordinary investigative device.”52 This is the question on which the
United States circuit courts are split, and the one that was addressed by the
Supreme Court in Dahda v. United States.53
D.

There is a Circuit Split on the Issue of Whether a Stationary Listening
Post Located Outside a District Court’s Jurisdiction and Used to Intercept Cell Phone Calls is a “Mobile Interception Device” for the Purposes of the Court’s Ability to Issue a Wiretap Order.
1.

The Tenth Circuit’s interpretation of the phrase “mobile interception device” in United States v. Dahda

The Dahda Court suggested three possible interpretations of the phrase
“mobile interception device” as provided by Title III: “(1) a listening device
that is mobile; (2) a cell phone being intercepted; or (3) a device that intercepts mobile communications, such as cell phone calls.”54 The court found
that only the first of these three possibilities is compatible with the text of
the statute.55

48. § 2518(10)(a).
49. § 2515 (“[w]henever any wire or oral communication has been intercepted, no part
of the contents of such communication and no evidence derived therefrom may be received in
evidence in any . . . proceeding . . . if the disclosure of that information would be in violation
of this chapter”).
50. § 2518(10)(a).
51. Dahda, 853 F.3d at 1114 (citing United States v. Foy, 641 F.3d 455, 463 (10th Cir.
2011) (holding “[n]ot all deficiencies in wiretap applications . . . warrant suppression.”)).
52. Id. (citing United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 527 (1974)); see United States v.
Radcliff, 331 F.3d 1153, 1162 (10th Cir. 2003) (extending this rule to suppression for facial
insufficiency under 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a)(ii))).
53. Dahda v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 356, 356 (U.S. Oct. 16, 2017) (No. 17-43).
54. Dahda, 853 F.3d at 1113.
55. Id.
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In Dahda, the wiretap ordered the authorized “interception of cell
phones located outside the issuing court’s territorial jurisdiction.”56 The listening posts used were also located outside of the court’s territorial jurisdiction.57 Therefore, the orders allowed interception outside the court’s territorial jurisdiction because there was no geographic restriction on the locations
of either the cell phones or the listening posts.58 As a result, the orders “violated the general rule that the interception must occur within the issuing
court’s territorial jurisdiction.”59
The court had to determine whether the stationary listening post used
by law enforcement could be considered a “mobile interception device,” as
the phrase is used in Title III.60 The court reasoned that a statute’s plain language controls unless the plain language would “produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intention of its drafters.”61 The court analyzed what
“mobile interception device” means by looking at the words’ grammatical
functions.62 According to the court, the word “‘mobile’ modifies ‘interception device,’ and the phrase ‘mobile interception device’ on its face appears
to refer to the mobility of the device used to intercept communications.”63
Therefore, the Tenth Circuit concluded that “mobile interception device”
can mean only a listening device that is mobile; thus, a stationary listening
device does not constitute a mobile interception device.64
2.

The Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of the phrase “mobile interception device” in United States v. Ramirez

In United States v. Ramirez, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit held that a stationary listening post used to intercept mobile
communicates constitutes a “mobile interception device” for the purposes of
Title III.65 In Ramirez, the defendants were convicted of conspiring to distribute methamphetamine based on evidence obtained from a wiretap of
their cell phones.66 The government suspected that Paul Hotchkiss (“Hotchkiss”), who lived in Wisconsin but dealt drugs in St. Paul, Minnesota, was
56. Id. at 1112.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Dahda, 853 F.3d at 1112.
61. Id. at 1113 (citing Starzynski v. Sequoia Forest Indus., 72 F.3d 816, 820 (10th Cir.
1995)).
62. Id.
63. Id. (citing United States v. North, 735 F.3d 212, 218 (5th Cir. 2013) (DeMoss, J.,
concurring)).
64. Id. at 1113–14.
65. United States v. Ramirez, 112 F.3d 849, 853 (7th Cir. 1997).
66. Id. at 851.
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using a cell phone owned by another defendant, Patrick Flynn (“Flynn”), to
carry out the conspiracy.67 The government believed that Hotchkiss carried
the phone with him as he traveled between Minnesota and Wisconsin dealing drugs.68
Using this information, the government obtained an order authorizing
the wiretapping of the cell phone line from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Wisconsin.69 The order was issued on April 13,
1995 and was valid for thirty days.70 The government set up its listening post
in Minnesota rather than in the Western District of Wisconsin where it obtained the authorization order.71 It located the post in Minnesota out of fear
that the agents handling the post were at risk for discovery “in the defendants’ home stomping ground.”72 Several days later, agents discovered that
Hotchkiss was not using the phone.73 The unknown user was talking with
Flynn about the drug conspiracy the government was investigating and did
not appear to be traveling outside of Minnesota.74 After the initial thirty days
expired, the government obtained an extension from the same district judge
in Wisconsin without disclosing that the cell phone and listening post were
both located in Minnesota.75
The case was later reassigned to a different federal judge.76 The defendants filed a motion to suppress based on the argument that the wiretap
authorization orders were facially invalid because the order authorized wiretapping outside of the judge’s territorial jurisdiction.77 The judge denied the
motion in regards to evidence obtained under the original wiretap, holding
that the order had been approved based upon the government’s reasonable
and good faith belief that the phone line was being used in the Western District of Wisconsin.78 The judge, however, granted the motion as to evidence
obtained as a result of the wiretap extension, holding that Title III did not
permit a judge in one district to authorize wiretapping in another district.79
The Seventh Circuit adopted the position of the Fifth and Second Circuits that “an interception takes place both where the phone is located and

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Ramirez, 112 F.3d at 851.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Ramirez, 112 F.3d at 851.
Id.
Id.
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where the scanner used to make the interception is located.”80 The court reasoned that a literal interpretation of the statute’s language would make little
sense and would prevent a judge from authorizing the interception of cell
phone calls through a stationary listening post when both the cell phone and
the listening post are located outside of the judge’s district.81 A literal reading of the statute,
would mean that if as in this case the listening post is stationary and is
for practical reasons located outside the district in which the crime is being investigated and the cellular phone is believed to be located, the government, to be sure of being able to tap the phone if it is carried outside
the district (as is it is quite likely to be, given its mobility), must obtain
the wiretap order from the district court in which the listening post is located, even though that location is entirely fortuitous from the standpoint
of the criminal investigation.82

According to the Seventh Circuit, “the legislative history of Title III
suggests that ‘mobile interception device’ was intended to carry a broader
meaning.”83 The legislative history describes the phrase as applicable “to
both a listening device installed in a vehicle and to a tap placed on a cellular
or other telephone instrument installed in a vehicle.”84 The court viewed this
language as “illustrative rather than definitional because there is no limitation to vehicles in the statute.”85
The court explained that “a ‘bug’ planted in a car phone is not a ‘mobile interception device’ in an obvious sense; it is a stationary device affixed
to a stationary object in a moving vehicle.”86 Similarly, a tap is not placed in
the telephone handset itself but rather is attached to the telephone line at
some distance from the handset.87 According to the court, the emphasis on
“mobile interception device” falls on the mobility of what is intercepted
rather than on the mobility of the device doing the intercepting.88 The court
further reasoned that the literal interpretation of the statute would complicate law enforcement efforts, while serving no interest in protecting privacy,
because the government can seek an order from the district court in which

80. Id. at 852 (citing United States v. Denman, 100 F.3d 399, 403 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Rodriguez, 968 F.2d 130, 136 (2d Cir. 1992)).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Ramirez, 112 F.3d at 852–53.
84. Id. (explaining that the Seventh Circuit “read this description to be illustrative rather
than definitional because there is no limitation to vehicles in the statute.”).
85. Id. at 852.
86. Id. at 852–53.
87. Id. at 853.
88. Id.
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the listening post is located authorizing nationwide surveillance of cell
phone calls.89
E.

There is a Circuit Split on the Issue of Whether Title III Requires Suppression of Evidence Obtained Pursuant to a Wiretap Order That is Facially Insufficient Because the Order Exceeds the Judge’s Territorial
Jurisdiction.

In determining whether suppression is required, some courts have applied the “core concerns” test of United States v. Chavez.90 This test looks at
whether the statutory violation implicates a core concern of Title III.91
1.

The Eleventh and Tenth Circuits have held that the territorial jurisdiction requirement does not implicate a core concern of Title
III, and therefore, violations of the territorial jurisdiction requirement do not merit suppression.
a.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Adams v. Lankford

In Adams v. Lankford, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found that the core concerns behind the statute were “(1) protecting the privacy of wire and oral communications; and (2) delineating on
a uniform basis the circumstances and conditions under which the interception of wire and oral communications may be authorized.”92 The court found
that the legislative history was “silent with respect to the connection, if any,
between the geographical limitations on state officials’ capacity to authorize
wiretaps on one hand and the statute’s concern for individual privacy on the
other.”93 As a result, the court held that a facially insufficient wiretap order
does not implicate a “core concern” of Congress and therefore suppression
is not required.94

89. Ramirez, 112 F.3d at 853.
90. See, e.g., United States v. Dahda, 853 F.3d 1101, 1114 (10th Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 356, 356 (U.S. Oct. 16, 2017) (No. 17-43); Adams v. Lankford, 788 F.2d 1493,
1499 (11th Cir. 1986).
91. United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562, 575 (1974).
92. Adams, 788 F.2d at 1498.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1500.
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit’s
application of the “core concerns” test in United States v.
Dahda

Applying the “core concerns” reasoning of Chavez, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit found that suppression is not required
for a district court’s authorization of wiretaps beyond a court’s territorial
jurisdiction because such a statutory violation does not implicate a core concern of Title III.95 The court analyzed the same two underlying concerns of
Title III that the Eleventh Circuit did in Adams.96 The court determined that
neither the privacy nor the uniformity concern was implicated because Section 2518(3)’s territorial jurisdictional limitation was not mentioned in the
legislative history of Title III.97 The Tenth Circuit expressly opined that it
thought suppression might actually undermine the goal of uniformity by
requiring prosecutors in multiple jurisdictions to coordinate how they use
electronic surveillance.98 The court rejected Mr. Dahda’s argument that the
territorial limitation thwarts forum shopping by showing two ways in which
the statute permits forum shopping.99
First, the court found that if the government wanted to seek a wiretap
order from a particular court and neither the target phones nor a listening
post was located in that court’s territorial jurisdiction, the government could
forum shop by using a mobile interception device.100 Second, the court
found that the government could forum shop by putting its listening post in
its preferred judge’s district.101 Because the statute does not restrict where
law enforcement can put its listening post, it can choose where it wants to
put it.102 As a result, the court concluded that suppression was not required
for district court’s authorization of wiretaps beyond the court’s territorial
jurisdiction.103

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Dahda, 853 F.3d at 1115–16.
Id. at 1114–15.
Id. at 1115–16.
Id. at 1115 (citing Adams, 788 F.2d at 1499).
Id.
Id. (citing 18 U.S.C.A. § 2518(3) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-281)).
Dahda, 853 F.3d at 1115.
Id.
Id. at 1114.
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The Fifth and District of Columbia Circuits have held that the territorial jurisdiction requirement does implicate a core concern of
Title III, and therefore, evidence obtained in violation of the territorial jurisdiction requirement must be suppressed.
a.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit’s
decision and subsequent “non-decision” in United States v.
North

In United States v. North, a judge in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Mississippi issued a wiretap order for a cell phone
based in Texas.104 The government believed the defendant was using the
phone to conduct his business of delivering drugs to Mississippi.105 While
the phone was based in Texas, the government’s listening post was located
in Louisiana.106 Initially, the Fifth Circuit held that the district court did not
have territorial jurisdiction to issue the wiretap.107 The court found that the
territorial jurisdiction limitation was a “core concern” of Congress, and
therefore, evidence from the wiretap must be suppressed.108 Two months
later, however, the court withdrew its initial decision and issued a second
opinion that did not reach the territorial jurisdiction issue but, instead, suppressed the evidence based on minimization issues.109
In its first decision, the Fifth Circuit addressed the territorial jurisdiction question, holding that “except in the case of a mobile interception device, a district court cannot authorize interception of cell phone calls when
neither the phone nor the listening post is present within the court’s territorial jurisdiction.”110 The court held that the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Mississippi lacked the authority to permit the interception of cell phone calls from Texas at a listening post located in Louisiana.111
The court addressed whether the lack of territorial jurisdiction requires
suppression of evidence obtained from a wiretap issued without jurisdictional authority, holding that

104. United States v. North, 735 F.3d 212, 214 (5th Cir. 2013).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. United States v. North (North I), No. 11-60763, at *5 (5th Cir. Aug. 26, 2013), superseded by North, 735 F.3d 212.
108. Id.
109. North, 735 F.3d at 215–17 (The court suppressed the evidence based on minimization issues and therefore did not reach North’s other arguments. Title III requires the government to take objectively reasonable measures in an effort to minimize the interception of
non-pertinent conversations).
110. North I, No. 11-60763, at *5.
111. Id.
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Title III’s territorial restrictions prevent forum manipulation by law enforcement, and prevent wiretap authorizations in cases where investigators would otherwise be able to obtain them. Limiting the number of district judges authorized to issue a wiretap warrant reduces the opportunity
for the government to use forum manipulation to obtain a warrant that
may not be approved elsewhere.112

The court opined that the territorial jurisdiction requirement implicates a
core concern of Title III – privacy.113 “Territorial limitations on a district
court directly implicate Congress’s intent to guard against the unwarranted
use of wiretapping.”114
Fewer than two months after its first decision in North, the Fifth Circuit, sua sponte, withdrew its first opinion and issued a new one.115 The
court did not decide the issue of territorial jurisdiction and ruled only on the
issue of minimization.116 These conflicting decisions by the Fifth Circuit
have further complicated the debate of whether there are jurisdictional limitations on the authority of federal judges to issue wiretaps under Title III.
b.

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit’s decision regarding jurisdictional limitations
in United States v. Glover

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) obtained a wiretap order
from a district judge in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit.117 The government wanted to place an audio recording
device on the defendant’s truck.118 The truck was parked outside the district
court’s jurisdiction, and therefore, the government sought a wiretap order
that would allow it to enter the truck regardless of its location.119
The court concluded that the order violated Title III on its face because
it authorized placing an interception device on property that was not within
the district court’s jurisdiction at the time of the order.120 In determining the
proper remedy for the violation, the court held that the “core concerns” test
does not apply to motions to suppress facially insufficient Title III wiretap
orders, and even if the “core concerns” test did apply, the territorial jurisdic112. Id. at 9.
113. Id. at 20. “We fail to see how this is not a significant protection of privacy.” Id. at 9.
114. Id. at 9.
115. United States v. North, 735 F.3d 212, 213 (5th Cir. 2013) (noting “Opinion, 728
F.3d 429, withdrawn and superseded”).
116. Id. at 212–16.
117. United States v. Glover, 736 F.3d 509, 510 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 514–15.
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tion limitation implicates a core concern of Title III.121 Thus, the court held
that “suppression is the mandatory remedy when evidence is obtained pursuant to a facially insufficient warrant.”122
The court further pointed out that to the extent that the statute is ambiguous, Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure governs, and it
is unambiguous.123 According to the court, Rule 41 partially implements the
statute and states that “a magistrate judge with authority in the district has
authority to issue a warrant for a person or property outside the district if the
person or property is located within the district when the warrant is issued
but might move or be moved outside the district before the warrant is executed.”124
III. ARGUMENT
A.

A Cell Phone is Not a “Mobile Interception Device” That Falls Within
a Court’s Ability to Issue a Wiretap Order.

A cell phone being intercepted cannot be a “mobile interception device,” unless a cell phone can intercept itself. In other words, as the Dahda
court pointed out, a cell phone “is the thing being intercepted, not the thing
being used to intercept.”125 Therefore, a particular cell phone cannot be intercepted while also being the device used to carry out the interception.126
Moreover, the plain language of Title III indicates that a device is
something used to intercept a call.127 Therefore, a “mobile interception device” must be something other than a cell phone that is being intercepted. 128
A mobile interception device must be a mobile device that intercepts communications.129 The Seventh Circuit’s holding in Ramirez, that the phrase
“mobile interception device” includes a cell phone being intercepted, is incompatible with the statute in that it ignores the statute’s unambiguous language providing that a device is something that is used to intercept a call.130
This interpretation simply does not make sense when one considers the definition of the word “device” under the statute.131
121. Id.
122. Id. at 514.
123. Glover, 736 F.3d at 515.
124. Id. (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(2)).
125. United States v. Dahda, 853 F.3d 1101, 1113 (10th Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 138 S.
Ct. 356, 356 (U.S. Oct. 16, 2017) (No. 17-43).
126. Id. at 1113.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1114.
129. Id. at 1113–14.
130. United States v. Ramirez, 112 F.3d 549, 852 (7th Cir. 1997).
131. Id.
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In addition, when Congress enacted Title III, cell phones did not exist.132 Therefore, it is clear that Congress would not have interpreted the
phrase “mobile interception device” to include a cell phone.133 Given this
fact and the statute’s plain language, it seems likely that Congress intended
“mobile interception device” to mean a listening device that is mobile and
not a cell phone.
B.

Courts Should Not Apply the “Core Concerns” Reasoning Because
Doing So Renders Section 2518(10)(a)(i) Meaningless.
Title III’s suppression remedy provides:
[A]ny aggrieved person in any trial, hearing, or proceeding in or before
any court, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, or other authority of the United States, a State, or a political subdivision thereof, may
move to suppress the contents of any wire or oral communication intercepted pursuant to this chapter, or evidence derived therefrom, on the
grounds that
(i) the communication was unlawfully intercepted;
(ii) the order of authorization or approval under which it was intercepted
is insufficient on its face; or
(iii) the interception was not made in conformity with the order of authorization or approval.134

Thus, there are three situations in which a person has a right to move to suppress the contents of any wire or oral communication.135 In United States v.
Chavez and United States v. Giordano, the Supreme Court of the United
States considered Title III’s suppression remedy in the context of Section
2518(10)(a)(i), which provides for suppression as result of an “unlawful[]
intercept[tion].”136 The Court made clear that not every violation of Title
III’s requirements results in an “unlawful interception” under Section

132. 5 major moments in cellphone history, CBC NEWS (Apr. 3, 2013, 5:33 AM),
http://www.cbc.ca/news/technology/5-major-moments-in-cellphone-history-1.1407352 (stating that on April 3, 1973, Motorola engineer Martin Cooper made the world’s first public call
from a mobile phone).
133. Brief of Amici Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation and Nat’l Assoc. of Criminal
Def. Lawyers in Support of Petitioners at 11, Dahda v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1491 (2018)
(No. 17-43).
134. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2518(10)(a) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-231).
135. Id.
136. United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562, 575 (1974); United States v. Giordano, 416
U.S. 505, 525–26 (1974); § 2518(10)(a)(i).
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2518(10)(a)(i).137 The Court held that suppression for an “unlawful[] intercept[tion]” is only required for a “failure to satisfy any of those statutory
requirements that directly and substantially implement the congressional
intention to limit the use of intercept procedures to those situations clearly
calling for the employment of this extraordinary investigative device.”138
In United States v. Radcliff, the Tenth Circuit extended the “core concerns” test of Giordano and Chavez to motions to suppress under Section
2518(10)(a)(ii).139 Section 2518(10)(a)(ii) provides for suppression when a
wiretap authorization order is insufficient on its face.140 On the contrary, the
District of Columbia Circuit noted in Glover that the “core concerns” test
articulated in Chavez and Giordano should not be extended to facially insufficient wiretap orders under Section 2518(10)(a)(ii). 141
Section 2518(10)(a)(i) applies to unlawful interceptions, while (ii) applies to a wiretap authorization order that is insufficient on its face.142 As
noted in Glover, however, these two appear to overlap because “if an authorization order is ‘insufficient on its face,’ the communication would necessarily be ‘unlawfully intercepted.’”143 Therefore, a broad reading of paragraph (i) would render the other two provisions of Section 2518(10)(a) superfluous.144
The “core concerns” test is a restriction on paragraph (i)’s unlawfully
intercepted language and was developed by the Supreme Court in order to
give meaning to the other paragraphs of Section 2518(10).145 When a court
applies the “core concerns” reasoning to Section 2518(10)(a)(ii), it essentially eliminates Title III’s suppression remedy for facially insufficient wiretap
orders because “anything that gives rise to suppression under paragraph (ii)
necessarily also does so under paragraph (i).”146 In other words, if you apply
the “core concerns” test to both the unlawfully intercepted and facially insufficient provisions of Section 2518(10)(a), they become one in the same,
and, therefore, Section 2518(10)(a)(ii) becomes “drained of meaning.”147
This is exactly what the Supreme Court was trying to avoid in Chavez and
137. Chavez, 416 U.S. at 575; Giordano, 416 U.S. at 526.
138. Giordano, 416 U.S. at 527.
139. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 8, at 8–9 (citing United States v. Radcliff,
331 F.3d 1153, 1162 (10th Cir. 2003)).
140. § 2518(10)(a)(ii).
141. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 8, at 13 (citing United States v. Glover,
736 F.3d 509, 513 (D.C. Cir. 2013)).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. (quoting United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562, 575 (1974)) (“a broad reading of
paragraph (i) would render (ii) and (iii) redundant and ‘drained of meaning.’”).
145. Id. at 19 (citing United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 525–26 (1974)).
146. Id. at 20 (citing Glover, 736 F.3d at 513).
147. Glover, 736 F.3d at 513 (quoting Chavez, 416 U.S. at 575).
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Giordano.148 The Court intended for the “core concerns” test to apply only
to paragraph (i), not (ii).149
Paragraph (i)’s provision that “an aggrieved person may move to suppress the contents . . . on the grounds that the communication was unlawfully intercepted” requires a general and broad analysis of the government’s
interception procedures to determine whether its actions infringed upon the
“core concerns” of the statute.150 Paragraph (ii) regarding suppression where
a wiretap authorization order is facially insufficient, on the other hand, requires a mechanical test.151 “The warrant is either facially sufficient or it is
not.”152 Title III does not provide for judicial discretion on this point because
the statute is clear.153 Evidence obtained as a result of a facially insufficient
wiretap authorization order must be suppressed.154 There is simply no need
for additional analysis when the statute is unambiguous.155
The wiretap authorizing law enforcement to conduct a wiretap of Mr.
Dahda’s phone line was facially insufficient because it authorized wiretapping outside the issuing court’s territorial jurisdiction without regard to
whether a “mobile interception device” would be used.156 The facial insufficiency of the wiretap order does not require examination of Congress’s
“core concerns” in enacting Title III but rather requires the application of
the mechanical test of Section 2518(10)(a)(ii).157
Applying the mechanical test of Section 2518(10)(a)(ii), the evidence
used to convict Mr. Dahda should have been suppressed as a violation of
Title III.158 A court’s failure to apply the mechanical test required by Section
2518(10)(a)(ii) results in the conviction of criminal defendants whose privacy rights were violated by the government’s failure to abide by the clear
requirements of Title III.159

148. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 8, at 20.
149. Id. at 13 (citing Glover, 736 F.3d at 515).
150. Glover, 736 F.3d at 513.
151. Id.
152. Id. (citing United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 527 (1974)).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. United States v. Dahda, 853 F.3d 1101, 1112 (10th Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 138 S.
Ct. 356, 356 (U.S. Oct. 16, 2017) (No. 17-43).
157. Giordano, 416 U.S. at 528.
158. Id.
159. Id.; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 8, at 23.
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Congress Enacted an Unambiguous and Mandatory Suppression Remedy to Minimize Unlawful Surveillance That Courts Should be Bound
to Apply.

If the “core concerns test” is applied, courts must recognize that the territorial jurisdiction limitation implicates a core concern of Title III. 160 Congress’s underlying reasons for enacting Title III—privacy and uniformity—
were implicated by Mr. Dahda’s argument that the wiretap order exceeded
the Kansas district court’s jurisdiction.
Title III contains a “statutorily mandated suppression remedy for violations of its requirements”.161 The statute provides, in relevant part,
“[w]henever any wire or oral communication has been intercepted, no part
of the contents of such communication and no evidence derived therefrom
may be received in evidence in any trial . . . if the disclosure of that information would be in violation of this chapter.”162
The Senate noted that the provisions for suppression and exclusion in
Title III are integral to the privacy regime established by the statute.163 Title
III’s suppression requirement is unambiguous.164 Nonetheless, courts have
simply decreed that facially insufficient wiretap orders, like the one in Mr.
Dahda’s case, do not merit suppression, without providing support for their
analyses.165
Congress enacted Title III to protect privacy and to advance the goal of
uniformity.166 It is not the judiciary’s role to decide on a case-by-case basis
whether it wants to implement the mandated suppression remedy provided
by statute. When courts do so, they undermine one of Congress’s main goals
in enacting Title III, uniformity, by creating incongruous results among fed-

160. Glover, 736 F.3d at 514–15.
161. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 8, at 5.
162. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2515 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-231).
163. S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 96 (1968), as reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2185.
164. § 2515 (stating “[w]henever any wire or oral communication has been intercepted,
no part of the contents of such communication and no evidence derived therefrom may be
received in evidence in any . . . proceeding . . . if the disclosure of that information would be
in violation of this chapter”).
165. See, e.g. United States v. Dahda, 853 F.3d 1101, 1114 (10th Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 356, 356 (U.S. Oct. 16, 2017) (No. 17-43); Adams v. Lankford, 788 F.3d 1493,
1499–1500 (11th Cir. 1986) (the territorial jurisdiction requirement does not implicate a core
concern of Title III, and therefore, violations of the territorial jurisdiction requirement do not
merit suppression).
166. S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 2156.
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eral courts.167 These different interpretations result in unfair adjudication for
criminal defendants.168
Furthermore, Title III’s territorial jurisdiction limitation limits the government’s opportunity to engage in forum shopping.169 Without the territorial jurisdiction limitation, law enforcement would be able to get a warrant in
a jurisdiction where it may not be approved elsewhere.170 Although the legislative history may not specifically mention forum shopping, it does mention privacy.171 Forum shopping would allow law enforcement to obtain a
wiretap authorization order from the judge of its choosing, making these
orders easier to obtain, and therefore, posing a threat to individual privacy.172
D.

Congress Should Update the Privacy Protections Under Title III to
Deal with the Increasing Threat to Privacy Posed by Advances in Wiretapping Technology

Congress and the federal judiciary have long recognized that wiretapping poses a serious threat to privacy, and today, that threat is even more
alarming.173 Wiretaps are arguably more intrusive than a physical search
warrant because they allow law enforcement to obtain the subject’s words,
as well as any communication between the subject and third parties.174
When Congress enacted Title III, it intended to permit wiretaps, but only under the “narrowest of circumstances.”175 The privacy concerns that animate Title III have become more pervasive with the proliferation of technology since 1968.176 Moreover, when Congress enacted Title III in the late
167. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 8, at 23.
168. Id. (noting that as matters currently stand, defendants are entitled to suppression of
evidence obtained through a wiretap order that exceeds the issuing court’s territorial jurisdiction in the D.C. Circuit, but not in the Tenth Circuit).
169. Brief of Electronic Frontier Found. and Nat’l Assoc. of Criminal Def. Lawyers in
Support of Petitioners, supra note 133, at 20.
170. Id. (citing United States v. North, 735 F.3d 212, 219 (5th Cir. 2013) (DeMoss, J.,
concurring)).
171. S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 66.
172. Brief of Electronic Frontier Found. and Nat’l Assoc. of Criminal Def. Lawyers in
Support of Petitioners, supra note 133, at 20–21.
173. Id. at 1–2.
174. Id. at 4–5 (“Whenever a telephone line is tapped, the privacy of the persons at both
ends of the line is invaded and all conversations between them upon any subject, and although proper, confidential, and privileged, may be overheard. Moreover, the tapping of one
man’s telephone line involves the tapping of the telephone of every other person whom he
may call, or who may call him.” Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 475–76 (1928)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
175. Id. at 1.
176. Id. at 11.
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1960s, it had no idea that wiretapping technology would be where it is today.177 Cell phones did not exist when Congress enacted Title III, and therefore, Congress never could have contemplated the ubiquitous nature of
smart phone technology.178
As wiretapping technology has evolved, it has become easier for the
government to obtain them.179 A physical intrusion is no longer necessary to
conduct a wiretap.180 In 2018, government agents have the ability to listen to
voice conversations, read texts, and view data communication, pictures, and
emails sent from anywhere.181 Cell phones contain a plethora of information
regarding “nearly every aspect of our lives . . . from the mundane to the intimate.”182
What is perhaps even more alarming is that an agent can do all of these
things from the comfort of his or her office.183 Since the enactment of Title
III, the number of wiretaps has increased dramatically, with over forty-three
million conversations intercepted last year.184 Interestingly, on average, only
about twenty percent of intercepted conversations are criminal in nature.185
In 2016, the most interceptions occurred in the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania.186 The district authorized the wiretap of 3,292,385 cell phone conversations or messages over a period of sixty
days.187 More frightening than this is the fact that out of the over three million conversations intercepted in one federal district in just sixty days, none
of the conversations were incriminating.188
Rapid advances in technology have resulted in nearly fifty years of
ambiguity regarding the interpretation and application of Title III. Thus, if
Congress was concerned about the privacy intrusion of wiretaps in the late
1960s, it should really be concerned about the privacy implications of wire-

177. Id.
178. Brief of Electronic Frontier Found. and Nat’l Assoc. of Criminal Def. Lawyers in
Support of Petitioners, supra note 133, at 11.
179. Id. at 2.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2490 (2014).
183. Brief of Electronic Frontier Found. and Nat’l Assoc. of Criminal Def. Lawyers in
Support of Petitioners, supra note 133, at 2.
184. Id. (showing 93% of the over 43 million conversations intercepted last year were
from “portable devices” or cell phones—only about 20% of these turn out to be incriminating, meaning 80% of conversations intercepted by the government have no criminal investigatory purpose).
185. Id. at 15.
186. Id. at 16.
187. Id.
188. Id.
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taps in 2018.189 After nearly half a century of ambiguity regarding phrases
used in Title III, such as “interception” and “mobile interception device,”
congressional action is overdue. Moreover, Congress needs to clarify the
correct application of Title III’s suppression remedy in cases involving wiretap authorization orders that exceed the issuing judge’s territorial jurisdiction. Title III is “in need of congressional attention” to address “[a]dvances
in wiretapping technology.”190 Despite the widespread use of technology,
American citizens must maintain the right to be free from unwarranted intrusions by the government.
Some of the terms and phrases of Title III are ambiguous and the suppression requirement provided for in Section 2518(10)(a)(ii) has not been
followed by all courts.191 This has resulted in incongruous results among the
United States circuit courts.192 This is unfair to criminal defendants, due to
the fact that the application of Title III’s suppression remedy often turns on
which court is hearing the defendant’s case.193 The suppression of evidence
based upon a facially insufficient wiretap order should not turn on which
court hears the case.
IV. CONCLUSION
A cell phone is not a “mobile interception device” that falls within the
court’s ability to issue a wiretap order because a “mobile interception device” means a mobile device used to intercept a call—a cell phone is the
thing being intercepted, not the thing used to do the intercepting.194 Furthermore, Title III requires suppression of evidence obtained pursuant to a wiretap order that is facially insufficient because the order exceeds the judge’s
territorial jurisdiction.195
The “core concerns” test announced in United States v. Chavez should
not be applied in situations like Mr. Dahda’s, and if the “core concerns” test
189. Brief of Electronic Frontier Found. and Nat’l Assoc. of Criminal Def. Lawyers in
Support of Petitioners, supra note 133, at 11.
190. United States v. Dahda, 853 F.3d 1101, 1118–19 (10th Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 138
S. Ct. 356, 356 (U.S. Oct. 16, 2017) (No. 17-43) (Lucero, J., concurring).
191. Compare id. at 1114, and Adams v. Lankford, 788 F.3d 1493, 1499 (11th Cir. 1986)
(explaining the territorial jurisdiction requirement does not implicate a core concern of Title
III, and therefore, violations of the territorial jurisdiction requirement do not merit suppression), with United States v. Glover, 736 F.3d 509, 514–15 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (explaining that
the territorial jurisdiction requirement does implicate a core concern of Title III, and therefore, evidence obtained in violation of the territorial jurisdiction requirement must be suppressed).
192. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 8, at 23.
193. Id.
194. Dahda, 853 F.3d at 1113–14.
195. Glover, 736 F.3d at 514–15.
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is applied, a facially insufficient wiretap order that exceeds the judge’s territorial jurisdiction implicates one of Title III’s core concerns.196
Regardless of the arguments that can be made by scholars, attorneys,
and courts, after fifty years of ambiguity regarding the language in Title III
and the intentions of Congress in enacting it, congressional action is long
overdue. It is essential that Congress clarify Title III and clarify how courts
should deal with facially insufficient wiretap orders. The widespread use of
wiretapping technology merits Congress’s time and efforts. Federal courts
need unambiguous guidance regarding the suppression of evidence obtained
on the basis of facially insufficient wiretap orders in order to implement the
law in a uniform and fair manner.
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